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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 




 The plaintiff, a wild horse advocacy group, brought an action against the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), protesting their decision to use various 
methods to prevent wild horses from breeding.  The plaintiff asserted that BLM’s 
decision violated a number of environmental acts.  The district court granted 
BLM summary judgment, after which the advocacy group appealed.  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, addressing each act alleged to be 
violated in turn.   
 
Facts and Analysis 
 Congress tasked the defendants with preserving the thousands of wild 
horses that live in the American West, while also taking into account the “needs 
of other wildlife and livestock that depend on the resources of public lands.”1  In 
2017, BLM determined that an overpopulation of wild horses in Nevada 
necessitated action, and it planned to “adjust the sex ratio of the population, 
administer fertility control treatment to mares, and geld and release back to the 
range some male horses.”2  This plan was called the Antelope and Triple B 
Complexes Gather Plan (“Gather Plan”), named for the areas of land that 
contained an excess population of wild horses.3  The purpose of the gelding 
component was to allow more horses to remain free-roaming, rather than to slow 
population growth.4  The plaintiffs objected specifically to the “geld and release” 
portion of the plan and claimed that BLM was in violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act, and the 
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHBA).5 
 BLM obtained a report from the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS 
Report”) that would assist BLM in creating a plan that would address anticipated 
challenges.6  The NAS Report noted that BLM must consider “changes in 
expression of sexual and social behavior” in horses when crafting its plan and 
emphasized pros and cons of potential sterilization methods.7  As the NAS Report 
was inconclusive in terms of the effects of gelding on herds of wild horses, BLM 
 
1 American Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt, 963 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2020). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. at 1006. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1004. The court discussed the statutory history of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and 
Burros Act at length.  Id. at 1004–05.  The amended version of the Act allows BLM to “remove 
excess horses when it faces overpopulation” and “the authority to use other population control 
methods . . . to avoid overpopulation.”  Id. at 1005.  Although BLM must consult with state 
wildlife agencies, it retains broad discretion in removing the excess animals.  Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1005–06. 
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conducted a study performing tests as to geldings’ effectiveness and its impact on 
the behavior of free-roaming wild horses.8 
 BLM received almost 5,000 public comments on a 2017 preliminary 
environmental assessment of the Gather Plan that stated experts’ concerns of the 
effects of gelding on the behavior of wild horses once the geldings were returned 
to the herd.9  BLM responded by concluding that the experts’ opinions were 
speculative as “none of them had conducted a study on the topic,” and that BLM 
was not required to create an environmental impact statement (“EIS”), as the 
Gather Plan would “not significantly affect the human environment.”10  The 
plaintiffs brought suit challenging BLM’s “geld and release” plan, claiming that 
BLM acted arbitrarily and capriciously.11 
 When considering the potential NEPA violations, the court noted that an 
EIS is needed when the federal action “‘significantly affect[s] the quality of the 
human environment.’”12  To make this determination, an agency must consider 
context and intensity (severity of the impact) of the effects of the action.13  The 
plaintiffs asserted that five out of ten intensity factors demonstrated that the 
Gather Plan may have had a significant impact and thus warranted an EIS.14  The 
court examined each contested factor in turn. 
 The first factor required an agency to prepare an EIS when the possible 
effects of its actions are “highly uncertain” and raise “substantial questions” about 
the action’s environmental impact.15  The court found that BLM’s plan did not 
meet this threshold, as they used the research that existed at the time to predict 
that effects of their plan would likely be insignificant.16  Drawing from precedents 
in prior cases, the court acknowledged that the fact that the “[Fish and Wildlife 
Service] did not have perfect information and had to extrapolate did not make the 
possible effects ‘highly uncertain’ and did not require the preparation of an 
EIS.”17  BLM did not have to find that its plan would have no effect on the 
environment, but rather that there were “not substantial questions as to whether 
gelding and release would have a significant effect on the environment.”18  
Although some of the long-term effects of the plan were unknown, BLM 
nevertheless drew reasonable conclusions about geldings’ behavior and family 
structures within the herds post-release and provided proper scientific foundation 
 
8 Id. at 1006.  Data from this study was not yet available at the time of the opinion, but will be 
analyzed in October 2020 at the earliest. Id. 
9 Id. at 1006–07. 
10 Id. at 1007. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)). 
13 Id. 1008 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5)). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. (citing Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 712 (9th Cir. 
2009)).  See also EPIC v. United States Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006); Native 
Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Service, 428 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2005).  
18 American Wild Horse Campaign at 1009. 
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for those conclusions.19  On this factor, the court found that BLM’s decision to 
not require an EIS was not arbitrary or capricious.20 
 The court also concluded that the effects of the Gather Plan were not 
“highly controversial” with regard to the second factor in question.21  Again, the 
plaintiffs did not provide any evidence that cast doubt on BLM’s conclusions, as 
the NAS Report was inconclusive and the plaintiffs’ experts provided only 
speculation, rather than citing existing research.22  “Opposition to an action does 
not, by itself, create a controversy within the meaning of NEPA regulations” and, 
because BLM “considered and addressed existing literature in its environmental 
assessment and provided reasoning for its conclusions,” the court found the 
NEPA requirements satisfied as to this factor.23 
 When examining the third factor regarding BLM’s determination that the 
gather area was not in proximity to “historic or cultural resources,”24 the court 
noted that wild horses cannot be considered a cultural resource under NEPA.25  
This is the case because the management of wild horses and evaluation of the 
effects of agency actions on wild horses are governed by the WHBA, which states 
that horses should be managed as “components of the public lands.”26  “A specific 
statute, such as the WHBA’s directive as to how to manage wild horses, governs 
over a general provision, such as NEPA.”27  Therefore, the court discounted the 
plaintiffs’ issue with this factor. 
 The plaintiffs also attested that the Gather Plan established precedent for 
“future actions with significant effects”28 (the fourth factor), but the court 
disagreed, finding that BLM’s plan did not “establish gelding as an accepted 
population-management tool” and that the plan was highly specific to the location 
and the project itself.29  Finally, there was no threat of a violation of federal law 
(the fifth factor) because BLM was acting in accordance with the WHBA.30  After 
examining all five factors, the court concluded that BLM’s determination that an 
EIS was not required was permissible because all intensity factors were properly 
considered.31 
 In their second claim, the “plaintiffs also argue[d] that BLM acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not address the Gelding Study, did not 
consider the expert opinions that the plaintiffs highlighted in their public 
comments, and did not adequately consider the NAS Report.”32  The court again 
addressed each of the plaintiffs’ arguments in turn.  
 
19 Id. 




24 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(3)). 
25 Id. at 1011. 
26 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a)). 
27 Id. (citing Perez-Martin v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
28 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. 1508.27(b)(6)). 
29 Id. at 1011–12. 
30 Id. at 1012. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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 Although the court noted that BLM did not address its Gelding Study at 
length in its environmental assessment, nor wait to authorize the plan until the 
data from the Study was collected, BLM did consider relevant factors raised by 
the study and “explained why additional information was not available.”33  The 
Gelding Study had not yet provided data on the effects of releasing gelded horses, 
so it was reasonable for BLM to not address this issue.34  However, after receiving 
complaints about the lack of research, BLM included a description of the study in 
its final environmental assessment, along with a note that the findings would not 
be ready for several years.35  This was sufficient to comply with NEPA’s “hard 
look” standard.36 
 Furthermore, the plaintiffs also argued that the Gather Plan violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act through BLM acting arbitrarily and capriciously in 
including gelding and release in the plan “without explaining why BLM no longer 
deemed the Study’s results necessary for informed-decision making.”37  However, 
the court concluded that BLM did not find the Study unnecessary – rather, 
components of the Gather Plan itself were meant to improve BLM’s knowledge of 
the effects of gelding and release.38  Furthermore, the WHBA does not obligate 
BLM to address all expert opinions submitted during the period for public 
comment.39  The court found that BLM’s action was not arbitrary or capricious in 
this respect because it gave reasons for not relying on those experts and pointed 
them toward sections of the environmental assessment that addressed the experts’ 
concerns.40  Finally, BLM complied with the WHBA in that it consulted the 
National Academy of Sciences to determine how “appropriate management levels 
should be achieved.”41  Although BLM did not address vasectomy expressly, the 
court noted that the NAS Report was ambivalent on the issue and BLM’s 
guidebook expresses similar uncertainty.42  Because the BLM’s reasoning for 
rejecting vasectomies were clear, the failure to respond to comments about the 
issue was not arbitrary or capricious.43 
 
Holding 
  The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding that BLM did not 
act arbitrarily and capriciously.44  The court emphasized that specific acts, such as 
the WHBA, supersede general provisions such as NEPA.45  Because all intensity 





36 Id. (citing In Defense of Animals v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 751 F.3d 1054, 1072–
73 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
37 Id. at 1012. 
38 Id. at 1012–13. 
39 Id. at 1013 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1013–14. 
44 Id. at 1004. 
45 Id. 
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environment were properly considered, BLM’s decision not to prepare an EIS was 
permissible.46  Furthermore, because BLM’s reasoning was clear in its 
environmental assessment, there was no arbitrary and capricious action in its 
failure to respond to all expert complaints or address all alternative methods of 
accomplishing its goal.47 
 
Impact 
 A broadly applicable concept from this case to administrative law as a 
whole is the court’s ruling that specific acts will always supersede general 
provisions, such as the WHBA’s domination over general NEPA provisions. 
Additionally, the court clarifies aspects of NEPA in this case, as well as 
establishes the standards for arbitrary and capricious agency action in terms of 
responding to public comments, relying on experts, and addressing all available 
research.  Finally, the court clarifies that wild horses do not fall under the 











46 Id. at 1012. 
47 Id. at 1014. 
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Doe v. University of St. Thomas, 972 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2020) 
 
Synopsis  
 A male student brought a negligence claim against the defendant (a private 
university) regarding an investigation of a sexual misconduct claim by a female 
student.  The investigation resulted in the male student’s suspension from the 
university.  Following an appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the university, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a private 
university’s common-law duty to prevent arbitrary expulsions of students covers 
expulsion as a result of non-academic related misconduct.  However, upon 
examination of the facts of this case, the court of appeals found that the 
university’s disciplinary process was not arbitrary and affirmed the ruling of the 
lower court. 
 
Facts and Analysis 
 The plaintiff John Doe, a student at the University of St. Thomas, was 
suspended from the university after a female student accused him of sexual 
misconduct.48  In response, Doe filed suit against the university asserting state law 
claims and Title IX violations.49  After hearing the case, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the university, “finding that Doe had not shown a genuine 
issue of fact that the disciplinary proceedings were biased against him or that any 
alleged procedural flaws breached the University’s duty of reasonable care.”50  
The court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo.51 
 On appeal, Doe argued that the university breached its duty of care 
because its “disciplinary process unfairly favored accusers and did not afford the 
necessary procedural due process protections.”52  The court first stated that it must 
determine what duty of care a private university owes its students.53  Although the 
parties agreed that Minnesota common law governed the determination, they 
disagreed over “whether the duty of care requires private universities 
investigating non-academic misconduct violations to act reasonably and in a 
manner that comports with constitutional due process or just refrain from acting 
arbitrarily.”54 
 The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not decided this 
issue (which would govern their decision), but cited a recent case, Abbariao v. 
Hamline University School of Law, which addressed the “common law duty 
universities owe their students.”55  The case involved a law student who claimed 
that an expulsion for failure to maintain required grades was a violation of his 
 






54 Id. at 1016–17. 
55 Id. at 1017. 
SPRING 2021 LEGAL SUMMARIES  
 
117
procedural due process rights and a common law duty of fair treatment.56  There, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that “an academic expulsion from a state 
actor violate[d] due process if it ‘results from the arbitrary, capricious, or bad-
faith actions of university officials.’”57  However, the court provided that 
“‘judicial examination into issues of academic performance may well be different 
from cases involving expulsion for alleged misconduct not directly related to 
academic proficiency.’”58  As private universities are not subject to federal due 
process requirements, the court noted that under Minnesota common law, “‘a 
university may not arbitrarily expel a student,’” relying on another case to reach 
this conclusion.59  After Abariao, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that even 
in non-academic misconduct discipline, the arbitrary manner standard was the 
proper measure to use.60 
 When looking at the case at hand, the court observed that the district court 
rejected precedent in Abariao and Rollins, instead using the reasonable care 
standard proposed by Doe, which stated that the university was obligated to 
utilize a process that was fair and impartial to all parties involved in the 
proceeding, and to provide some measure of due process to ensure accuracy in the 
eventual outcome.61  The court found that the lower court erred in rejecting this 
precedential standard, noting that there was no reason to disregard Rollins, as it 
applied the common law duty to a non-academic expulsion by a private 
university.62  The district court instead incorrectly applied the arbitrary standard 
used in Gleason, which involved a student with both academic and misconduct 
charges.63 
 However, the court ultimately found that “[e]ven under the district court’s 
more permissive reasonable care standard, Doe’s claims did not survive summary 
judgment.”64  Applying the correct standard of Abbariao, the court reached the 
same conclusion.65  Doe brought evidence alleging that the university’s training 
materials caused officials to be biased against accused students, providing 
samples of materials and statistics made available to university staff.66  The 
district court found that “Doe had not overcome the presumption of honesty and 
 
56 Id. (referencing Abbariao v. Hamline University School of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 111 
(Minn. 1977)).  
57 Id. (citing Abbariao at 112). 
58 Id. (citing Abbariao at 113). 
59 Id. (citing Abbariao at 112).  The Abbariao court relied on Gleason v. University of 
Minnesota, a case where the student in question had been charged with both academic deficiencies 
and “certain insubordinate acts toward the faculty of the University of Minnesota and with inciting 
younger students to insubordinate acts towards said faculty.”  See Gleason, 104 Minn. 359, 363 
(1908). 
60 Doe at 1017 (referencing Rollins v. Cardinal Stritch University, 626 N.W.2d 464, 470 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001)). 





66 Id. at 1018–19. 
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integrity afforded to school administrators.”67  This presumption cannot be 
overcome unless “actual bias, such as personal animosity, illegal prejudice, or a 
personal or financial stake in the outcome can  be proven.”68  Because Doe 
presented no evidence to show individual bias against him, the district court 
granted summary judgment.69 
On review, the Eighth Circuit agreed that there was no genuine dispute of 
material fact in the case.70  Although the court was “troubled” by the use of 
stereotypes in the university’s training, it noted there was no evidence presented 
that the materials influenced university officials’ judgment and that no reasonable 
jury would find bias in the investigation.71  Because there was no evidence of 
individualized bias or “that University’s proceedings were the product of will, 
instead of judgment,” the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment.72 
 
Holding 
 The court affirmed the lower court’s decision after a de novo review of its 
interpretation of state law.73  After a thorough review of Minnesota case law, the 
court held that although the district court utilized the wrong standard in granting 
summary judgment, the correct standard leads to the same result.74  Because Doe 
was unable to show any evidence of individualized bias against him or any 
prejudice in the university’s proceedings regarding him, the court affirmed the 
lower court’s granting of summary judgment.75 
 
Impact 
 This case establishes the bar for the extension of common law duties to 
private universities in matters related to non-academic expulsion in the Eighth 
Circuit.  Defining “arbitrary” in cases such as these, however, will still require 
further time, as the court noted.  Evidence of individualized bias or prejudice in 
expulsion proceedings will be required to bring a successful case of this type in 










67 Id. at 1019. 
68 Id. (citing Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
69 Id. at 1019. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1019. 
73 Id. at 1016. 
74 Id. at 1018–19. 
75 Id. at 1018. 
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DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. Small Business Administration, 
960 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2020) 
 
Synopsis 
  The Small Business Administration (SBA) enacted a rule excluding 
sexually oriented businesses from Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan 
guarantees under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(CARES Act).  A number of sexually oriented businesses brought an action 
claiming that the SBA exceeded its statutory authority in adopting this rule.  
Following the district court’s grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
judgment, the SBA moved for a stay pending an appeal.  The Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that the SBA should not be allowed a stay. 
 
Facts and Analysis  
 At issue was the interpretation of congressional legislation meant to 
address economic hardship caused by COVID-19.76  Congress enacted the PPP, 
which allowed the SBA to “guarantee up to $349 billion in PPP loans,” and 
increased the guaranteed amount to $649 billion in April of 2020.77  The text of 
the legislation states that:  
 
in addition to small business concerns, any business concern, 
nonprofit organization, veterans organization, or Tribal business 
concern described in section 657a(b)(2)(C) of this title shall be 
eligible to receive a covered loan if the business concern, nonprofit 
organization, veterans organization, or Tribal business concern 
employs not more than the greater of-- (I) 500 employees; or (II) if 
applicable, the size standard in number of employees established 
by the Administration for the industry in which the business 
concern, nonprofit organization, veterans organization, or Tribal 
business concern operates.78 
 
The SBA enacted a “PPP Ineligibility Rule,” which “renders sexually 
oriented businesses and certain other businesses ineligible to receive PPP loan 
guarantees.”79  The plaintiffs (owners of various sexually oriented businesses) 
contended that their businesses were lawful and operated within the constraints of 
licenses and permits, but that the SBA denied their applications for loans based on 
the PPP Ineligibility Rule.80  The district court found that the SBA “exceeded its 
statutory authority when it adopted this rule and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
 
76 DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. Small Bus. Admin., 960 F.3d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 2020). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (citing 15 USC § 636(a)(36)(D)(i) (emphasis added)). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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preliminary injunctive relief.”81  The SBA responded by moving “to stay the 
preliminary injunction pending a decision on the merits of the appeal.”82  
The court utilizes a four factor test to determine whether a stay should be 
granted: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the 
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably 
harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court 
grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.”83 
When considering the first factor, the standard of review is highly 
deferential to the district court and the review is only to determine whether there 
was an abuse of discretion.84  The court then turned to the framework for 
determine the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a statute: “[f]irst, always, is 
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”85  The district court applied this framework and found that the CARES 
Act, as written by Congress, prevented the SBA from refusing aid to sexually 
oriented businesses.86  Citing the term “any business concern” and noting that 
‘any’ “carries an expansive meaning,” the district court found that provided a 
business met the size criteria, it should be eligible for aid.87  This interpretation 
implies that Congress specifically made the SBA’s ineligibility rules 
inapplicable.88 
The SBA responded that the CARES Act included a specification for 
“nonprofit organizations” as eligible for PPP loans, despite their normal 
ineligibility for SBA loans normally.89  Therefore, if Congress had intended for 
sexually oriented businesses to be eligible, it could have included similar 
clarifying language.90  The court disagreed, however, stating that the broad term 
“any business concern” encompassed sexually oriented businesses, but not non-
profits (as they are not businesses), so specialized language was required for their 
inclusion.91 
The court then analyzed the remaining factors as a group, stating that “the 
harm to the SBA in the absence of a stay is far outweighed by the harm to the 
plaintiffs if a stay is granted.”92  Without the aid from the PPP (which would 




83 Id. at 746 (quoting Mich. Coal of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 
150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
84 Id. (citing Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 
535, 541 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
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lose their businesses, which would be contrary to the PPP’s stated purpose of 
“protect[ing] the employment and livelihood of employees.”93  The public interest 
would also be served in “guaranteeing that any business, including [the] 
plaintiffs’, receive loans to protect and support their employees during the 
pandemic.”94  As the SBA guarantees loans on a first-come, first-served basis, 
other businesses may not receive loans whether or not the plaintiffs’ businesses 
are permitted to do so.95 
The dissent held that Congress’s language in the CARES Act remained 
ambiguous regarding whether “any business concern” was meant to modify the 
preceding language of the Act or whether, as the court found, it should be 
interpreted to mean that any business was eligible for a PPP loan with no regard 
to prior SBA restrictions.96  Congress noted that PPP loans are meant to be 
distributed “under the same terms, conditions, and processes” as 7(a) loans, which 
would normally exclude sexually oriented businesses from eligibility.97  Because 
of CARES Act’s ambiguity, the dissent found that the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated a “strong likelihood of success on the merits” required for the court 
to deny the stay until a more “careful analysis of the law” could be conducted.98 
 
Holding 
Applying the Chevron framework, the Court upheld the district court’s 
preliminary injunction. It held that sexually oriented businesses were meant to be 
included under the CARES Act framework because of the broad language 
Congress chose to use, and could not be excluded from PPP loans by the SBA.99  
Additionally, public policy would better be served by allowing the plaintiffs’ 
businesses to receive loans, as more businesses and employees would be protected 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.100  Based on a balancing of the relevant factors, 
the court denied the SBA’s motion for a stay.101 
 
Impact 
 In the difficult times the world now faces with the COVID-19 pandemic, 
determining who receives what type of aid is not an easy task, and the courts 
likely will have to interpret Congress’s language and intent to make difficult 
decisions.  This order is a prime example. However, as the dissent points out, if 
the language is ambiguous and can be subject to different meanings among the 








96 Id. at 747 (Siler, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 748. (Siler, J., dissenting, citing 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(B)). 
98 Id. (Siler, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. at 746. 
100 Id. at 747. 
101 Id. 
40-2 JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY 
 
122 
Greenbrier Hospital, LLC v. Azar, 974 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2020) 
 
Synopsis 
  The plaintiff healthcare provider brought action against the defendant, the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to obtain 
judicial review of the defendant’s interpretation of the Medicare reimbursement 
scheme as it relates to inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs).  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that the interpretation of the reimbursement scheme put forth by 
the Secretary was reasonable.  
 
Facts and Analysis  
 The conflict in this case surrounded provisions governing the 
“compensation formula for the payment of certain health care providers—a 
formula that changes once a year.”102  However, on January 1, it was unclear 
which formula (the previous year’s or the new year’s) applied for payments made 
on that day.103  
 HHS issued a rule at the direction of Congress in 2004 that set forth the 
new reimbursement scheme for inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs).104  The rule 
contained a transition schedule from the previous reimbursement system to a new 
system over a three-year period.105  During this transition, IPFs would get a 
“blended payment”—a combination of the old reimbursement scheme and the 
new one, the combination of which would vary year by year, with the new 
formula taking effect on July 1.106  However, in 2005, HHS put forth a correction 
that allowed the new formula to take effect on January 1, as opposed to July 1.107  
However, the language of the corrected regulation left an ambiguity about which 
scheme (the old year’s or the new year’s) applied on January 1.108  This was a 
problem because, as the court noted, “[f]or example, a cost reporting period 
beginning on January 1, 2006, appears to be eligible for both the 25% per diem 
rate and the 50% per diem rate—an obvious problem because presumably an IPF 
can be reimbursed under only one formula per year.”109 
 The plaintiff IPF, Greenbrier Hospital, asserted that this ambiguity 
allowed it to choose which formula it wished to apply, and applied for 
reimbursement under the preceding year’s formula.110  The Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS) rejected the plaintiff’s claim, paid it under the new 
formula and reversed a Provider Reimbursement Review Board determination to 
the contrary.111  The plaintiff then sought judicial review and the district court 
 
102 Greenbrier Hospital, LLC v. Azar, 974 F.3d 546, 548 (5th Cir. 2020). 
103 Id. at 547–48. 
104 Id. at 548. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 549. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 549–50. 
111 Id. at 550. 
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granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the Administrator’s 
interpretation of the conflicting provisions was reasonable.112 
In the beginning of the opinion, the court described the protocol for 
analysis when provisions of the same law appear to conflict.  The process began 
by “attempt[ing] to reconcile the competing provisions in a manner that gives 
effect to each one.”113  If provisions cannot be reconciled, the court noted that 
they must save as much of the statute as they can and determine “which of the two 
conflicting provisions should govern in a particular case.”114  Finally, if the court 
cannot determine which provision should control, the court should deny both 
provisions of the law and move forward, although this is a last resort.115 
When applying this analysis to the provisions at issue in this case, the 
court chose “to minimize damage to text by giving effect to the provision most 
obviously dictated by the context of the rule.”116  The court accomplished this by 
examining the text of the previous rule and noting that the previous timespan was 
July 1 to June 30, which caused no conflict.117  Therefore, the court concluded 
that by following the spirit of the previous rule, the new formula should be given 
effect on January 1.118 
When examining this case, the court noted that “reconcil[ing] potentially 
conflicting provisions by attempting to read the text in harmony” would be 
impossible here because of the incongruity of the text.119  The court instead chose 
to look to context to do the least damage to the text and found that the 2005 rule 
should be construed “to give effect to the new formula, and not the formula from 
the preceding year, when presented with a cost report that begins on January 
1.”120  HHS made clear in its argument before the court that the correction in 
question was not a change in policy; rather, it was meant to “conform the 
regulation text to the actual policy.”121  The court found unpersuasive the 
plaintiff’s argument that it should choose the formula that applies on January 1 
because there was no substantive change in policy, and allowing the plaintiff IPF 
to choose would contradict that notion.122  Furthermore, nowhere in the text of the 
rule itself does it allow an IPF to choose the formula itself, and the plaintiff was 
unable to support this position substantively.123 
The court noted its decision cannot resolve the conflict in the legislation in 
its entirety, so it simply affirmed the lower court’s decision to “limit the damage 
to text by applying the new incoming rule on January 1, rather than the old rule 
from the preceding year.”124 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 547. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 547–48. 
116 Id. at 548. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 550. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. (citing 70 Fed. Reg. 16724, 16726 (Apr. 1, 2005)). 
122 Id. at 551. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 




 The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing with the agency’s 
proposal for how the compensation scheme should be interpreted.125  After the 
proper analysis involving two provisions of the same law that appear to conflict, 
the court examined previous legislation in the same area to find context for the 
rule, and used this context to reach a conclusion.126  The new provisions should be 
interpreted in the same way that the previous provisions operated: the new system 
for compensation should take effect on January 1 of the new year, as opposed to 
the previous year’s system.127 
 
Impact 
 This ruling demonstrates the attitude courts have toward interpreting 
legislation that is internally inconsistent.  Here, the court wielded its authority to 
interpret the rule for specific situations such as the one before it, but ideally to do 
the least damage to the text possible, to preserve the legislature’s role in the 
branch system.  Whether other courts will follow the Fifth Circuit’s lead remains 
to be seen, but this case undoubtedly sets a standard for the judicial attitude 
toward interpreting conflicting legislation. 
  
 
125 Id. at 548. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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Level the Playing Field v. Federal Election Commission, 961 F.3d 
462  
(D.C. Cir. 2020) 
 
Synopsis 
  Level the Playing Field, a non-profit corporation created to enhance 
public awareness of independent candidates for elected office, challenged the 
Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) dismissal of their complaint under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  The corporation’s complaint challenged the 
Commission on Presidential Debates’ (CPD) use of polling criteria to determine 
whether a candidate should participate in presidential debates. The complaint also 
sought equitable relief that the FEC adjust its rules to forbid debate sponsors from 
using public opinion polls to determine a candidate’s eligibility to participate.  
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FEC did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously in making two determinations about the CPD’s conduct: 
that the CPD was not overtly partisan, and that the requirement that a candidate 
obtain support from at minimum 15% of the national electorate satisfies the 
requirement for objective criteria. 
 
Facts and Analysis  
 The plaintiffs—Level the Playing Field, and one registered voter from the 
District of Columbia, the Green Party, and the Libertarian National Committee 
each—brough suit against the FEC (the defendant), asserting that the CPD lends 
support to Republican and Democratic nominees for public office to the detriment 
of those nominees from third-parties and that the “CPD uses subjective and biased 
criteria for selecting debate participants.”128  The government does not fund the 
CPD; instead, it “is governed by an independent Board of Directors.”129  The CPD 
imposes three requirements on potential participants in debates it sponsors: that 
the candidate be qualified for President under the Constitution, that the candidate 
be “on the ballot of enough states to have a mathematical chance of winning a 
majority vote in the Electoral College,” and that the candidate have “a level of 
support of at least 15% of the national electorate,” a criterion which is determined 
by an average of the recent results of five public opinion polling organizations.130  
The plaintiffs’ administrative complaints challenged the final requirement, and 
petitioned the FEC to change its rules to “prohibit debate sponsors from using 
public opinion polls as a criterion for eligibility.”131  The FEC dismissed both 
complaints.132 
 The plaintiffs brought the case to the district court, alleging a violation of 
the Administrative Procedure Act.133  The district court remanded both matters to 
 
128 Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 961 F.3d 462, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 463–64. 
131 Id. at 464. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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the FEC, who returned the same result.134  The district court then granted 
summary judgment in favor of the FEC, and the plaintiffs appealed, bringing the 
case before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.135 
 The court began its opinion by noting its deference in judicial review to 
decisions of the FEC.136  Although the plaintiffs requested a less deferential 
standard of review, alleging that the decisions in question display a “partisan 
agenda,” the court noted that decisions involving bias of this manner are those to 
which the existing arbitrary-and-capricious standard would apply.137  
Accordingly, the court did not create a new standard of review to utilize in this 
case.138 
 The court then moved to the plaintiffs’ assertion that the FEC ignored the 
CPD’s blatant bias against independent candidates.139  The court agreed with the 
FEC that early statements made about the CPD around the time of its founding do 
not describe the CPD in its current form, and supported the need for context 
surrounding these statements.140  Additionally, the court concurred with the FEC 
in that individuals’ statements could not be “indicative of CPD’s organizational 
endorsement of or support for the Democratic and Republican Parties and their 
candidates.”141  More contemporaneous statements made by leading officials fell 
under the same argument.142  The court of appeals agreed with the district court 
that a disagreement over whether partisan activities reflect the views of an 
employee’s organization did not relieve the plaintiffs of their burden to prove that 
the FEC acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.143 
 The plaintiffs also presented two expert reports to the district court to 
suggest that the “15% polling requirement to select debate candidates is 
‘subjective’ and favors major-party candidates.”144  The FEC, in examining these 
reports, found them unpersuasive, and the court in turn found the FEC’s critiques 
of the two reports reasonable.145  More broadly, however, the court stated that 
simply because a threshold is difficult to reach for a third party candidate, it does 
not become an inherently subjective criterion for determining a candidate’s 
eligibility to participate in debates.146 
 The court once again expressed deference to the FEC when considering 
the plaintiffs’ final request, for the FEC to initiate a rulemaking to prohibit debate 
sponsors from using polling thresholds to determine a candidate’s eligibility for 
debates.  Because “[f]ederal agencies have ‘broad discretion to choose how to 
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 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs 
did not meet their burden in showing that the FEC’s decision in dismissing their 
complaints was arbitrary or unreasonable.148  On the contrary, the FEC 
“thoughtfully evaluated the record” and “offered detailed explanations in support 
of its view that the plaintiffs failed to show impermissible bias against 
independent candidates or in favor of candidates from the two major political 
parties.”149  Noting the increased difficulty for independent candidates to meet the 
15% requirement, the court did not find this measure subjective and ruled for the 
FEC.150 Finally, because the court “found that the [FEC] acted reasonably in 
reaching those decisions, [it held] that the [FEC] did not err by electing not to 
initiate a rulemaking.”151  
 
Impact 
 The court’s deference to decisions made by the FEC is particularly 
relevant as 2020 is an election year.  The court has noted that it will hold the 
plaintiffs to the established arbitrary and capricious standard152 and that a finding 
of reasonableness in the FEC’s actions will likely result in a holding that the FEC 
did not err in its decision making.153  The ruling here sets a continued precedent of 




147 Id. at 469 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007)). 
148 Id. at 467. 
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Mendez v. Barr, 960 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2020) 
 
Synopsis  
 Tomas Mendez was charged by the Department of Homeland Security 
with being inadmissible due to his conviction of misprision of felony.  Following 
a sustainment of the charge by both an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of 
Immigrant Appeals (BIA), Mendez petitioned the court for review.  The court 
found that a conviction of misprision did not render an alien inadmissible because 
a misprision conviction is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. 
 
Facts and Analysis 
 In 2004, Tomas Mendez was admitted to the United States as a permanent 
resident.154  Six years later, he was convicted of misprision of a felony under 18 
U.S.C. § 4, which criminalizes the act of concealing “knowledge of the 
commission of a federal felony” and failure to “report it to the appropriate 
authorities.”155  Upon Mendez’s return from a trip overseas in 2016, the 
Department of Homeland Security found him inadmissible because he was a 
“noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).”156  “The 
immigration judge sustained the charge, and the Board of Immigration . . . 
affirmed,” concluding “that the violation of Section 4 meant that [Mendez] had 
committed a CIMT.”157 
  A CIMT is a “crime that is ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved, and 
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed between persons or to 
society in general.’”158  Although misprision was not always considered a CIMT, 
the Eleventh Circuit found that “a conviction under Section 4 is categorically a 
CIMT ‘because it necessarily involves an affirmative act of concealment or 
participation in a felony, behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties 
and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.’”159  However, this view is not 
unchallenged throughout the courts.160 
 Mendez brought a motion to terminate removal proceedings and for 
cancellation of removal, on the grounds that misprision is not categorically a 
CIMT.  The IJ found Mendez removable, and following this, the BIA issued a 
decision, declining to follow the Ninth Circuit’s holding that misprision is not 
categorically a CIMT.  Mendez petitioned the court for review, arguing that “a 
conviction for misprision is not a CIMT because it does not categorically involve 
conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved” and that the BIA’s decision in 
this case is not entitled to Chevron deference.161 
 The court began by addressing Mendez’s first argument.  The BIA and the 
courts use a “‘categorical approach’ focusing on the intrinsic nature of the 
 




158 Id. at 82–83 (citing Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
159 Id. at 83 (citing Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
160 Id. at 83.  See Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 710-12 (9th Cir. 2012). 
161 Mendez at 83–84. 
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offense” to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a CIMT.162  The 
conviction elements under Section 4 consist of “(1) the principal committed and 
completed the alleged felony, (2) the defendant had full knowledge of that fact, 
(3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities, and (4) the defendant took steps 
to conceal the crime.”163  The court found that the categorical approach failed in 
this case, as a critical component of a CIMT is an evil intent, but nothing in 
Section 4 references intent whatsoever.164  The court provided several examples to 
further emphasize its point that the crime of misprision can occur without any evil 
intent in the mind of the defendant.165  Furthermore, the BIA itself has previously 
held that misprision does not contain an intent element that would qualify it as a 
CIMT.166   
 The government attempted to combat these findings by relying on 
precedent “that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral 
turpitude.”167  The court disagreed, however, finding that Congress would have 
chosen to include an intent requirement had it felt it appropriate and if an intent 
requirement was “implied” into Section 4, it would be extremely difficult to 
determine whether any crime was a CIMT.168 
 The dissent concluded that misprision should qualify as a CIMT because it 
involves “dishonest and deceitful behavior.”169  The majority dismissed the 
dissent’s argument by noting that should it be accepted, it would “eviscerate the 
distinction in the law between generic criminal conduct and crimes involving 
moral turpitude, thus turning almost all crimes into CIMTs.”170  Furthermore, the 
court notes that it is unlikely that Congress intended that any individual who fails 
to inform proper authorities of a crime has “committed a crime that is inherently 
vile and immoral.”171  According to its own precedent, the BIA has held that more 
than deceit or intent to conceal is needed to qualify a crime as a CIMT.172 
 The government also argued that Chevron deference should be given to 
the BIA’s decision that Section 4 be classified as a CIMT.173  The court disagreed, 
finding that although Chevron deference applies to the BIA’s published 
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it does not apply to its 
“interpretation of a criminal statute.”174 
 
162 Id. at 84 (citing Gill v. I.N.S., 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
163 Id. (citing United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 85. 
166 Id.  See Matter of Mendez, 27 I&N Dec. 219, 223 (B.I.A. 2018); Matter of Espinoza-
Gonzales, 22 I&N Dec. 889, 896 (B.I.A. 1999); Matter of Sloan, 12 I&N Dec. 840, 842 
(B.I.A.1968). 
167 Mendez, 960 F.3d at 86 (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951)). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 93 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
170 Id. at 86. 
171 Id. at 87. 
172 Id. at 88.  To support this point, the court cites a number of examples of BIA decisions in 
which the BIA found that an intent element was required for a crime to merit a distinction of a 
CIMT. 
173 Id.  For a discussion on Chevron, see supra pg. 3. 
174 Mendez at 88. 




 The court found that because crimes under Section 4 do not have an evil 
intent requirement among their elements, they cannot be categorically classified 
as CIMTs.175  The BIA’s argument that an intent requirement could be “implied” 
into Section 4 was also rejected, as it would make the test too difficult to 
practically apply.176  Finally, the court did not give Chevron deference to the 
BIA’s interpretation of Section 4, as it was only an interpretation of a criminal 
statute rather than an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”177 
 
Impact   
 In this decision, the Second Circuit joined with the Ninth Circuit in 
holding that misprision cannot be categorically classified as a CIMT.178  This 
decision could have repercussions for the immigration system and potentially 
loosen the definition of a CIMT.  If a crime does not explicitly contain an intent 
requirement in its elements, it likely cannot be considered a CIMT for the 
purposes of charges by the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, the 
court clarified that Chevron deference should only be given to the BIA’s 
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, rather than any 
interpretation made by the agency. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. 
DeVos, 2020 WL 5291406 1 (D.D.C. 2020) 
 
Synopsis 
 The plaintiff advocacy groups, public school districts, and parents of 
children enrolled in public school, brought an action against the defendant 
Department of Education (Department) to challenge its implementation of the 
provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES 
Act) regarding funding to aid schools.  They specifically challenged the 
Department’s finding that the legislation prohibited differentiation between 
private and public schools when considering aid distribution.  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the Department was 
meant to provide equitable services using the framework set forth in the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and that the 
Department exceeded its authority in using an interim final rule in interpreting the 
provision of the CARES Act. 
 
Facts and Analysis 
 Congress passed the CARES Act in response to the COVID-19 crisis, 
which in part allocated billions of dollars to schools to assist them through the 
challenges of the global pandemic.179  Of the three sub-funds, two were relevant 
to this litigation: the Governors’ Emergency Relief Fund (GEER), which provided 
governors “with discretion to distribute funding to the Local Education Agencies 
(LEAs) that need it the most,” and the Elementary and Secondary School 
Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER), which directed the Department of Education to 
distribute funds to each state, which would then in turn distribute to LEAs, which 
would pass on the funding to schools according to a formula.180  While the GEER 
fund allowed room for discretion in distribution of funds, the ESSER did not – it 
mandated that funds “shall be allocated by the Secretary to each state in the same 
proportion as each State received under part A of title I of the [ESEA] of 1965 in 
the most recent fiscal year.”181  Additionally, the CARES Act dictated how 
private schools could qualify for GEER and ESSER funding by referencing the 
method established in the ESEA, which stated that expenditures to private schools 
should be equal to “the proportion of funds allocated to participating school 
attendance areas based on the number of children from low-income families who 
attend private schools.”182 
 In April of 2020, the Department of Education “advised that GEER and 
ESSER funds should be used to ‘serve all non-public school students and teachers 
 
179 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. DeVos, 2020 WL 
5291406, at *1 (D.D.C. 2020). 
180 Id. at 1. 
181 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020)). 
182 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6320(a)(4)(A)(i)). 
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without regard to family income, residency, or eligibility based on low 
achievement.’”183  It issued an interim final rule expressing the same position in 
July 2020, finding that the “text of the CARES Act was ambiguous and its 
interpretation was reasonable in light of the text, structure, and purpose of the 
CARES Act.”184  In its interim order, the Department stated that LEAs have two 
choices: to “disburse funds equally between all public schools and all private 
schools or disburse funds based on low-income student population for both public 
and private schools.”185  Regardless of the method employed by LEAs, the 
Department interpreted the CARES Act to prohibit “differentiation between 
public and private schools.”186  As the CARES Act did not vest rulemaking 
authority on the Department, the Department instead utilized its general 
rulemaking powers in “administer[ing] programs under its purview.”187  
Furthermore, the typical notice and comment rulemaking was foregone by the 
Department, who instead cited the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exception 
for good cause, noting the current global pandemic.188 
 The plaintiffs brought suit in July of 2020 and moved for a preliminary 
injunction or summary judgment in August 2020.189  They contended that “the 
Department did not have the authority to issue the interim final rule” and that “the 
interim final rule the Department did issue was contrary to the CARES Act.”190 
 To assess the plaintiffs’ claims, the court utilized the Chevron analysis – it 
first determined whether the statute was ambiguous as written and if not, the 
inquiry ends.191  However, if the statute is ambiguous, the court determines 
whether the interpretation of the agency at question is reasonable, and if so, it is 
entitled to proper deference.192   
When applying that analysis to the statute at issue here, the court found 
that “[i]n describing the funding mechanism for the GEER and ESSER sub-funds, 
Congress spoke with clarity and precision” by “us[ing] mandatory language, 
cross-referenc[ing] a statutory provision by section number, and [leaving] no term 
up to interpretation.”193  By using ordinary language in the statute, Congress’s 
intent was to ensure that LEAs distributed funds in the same manner as in the 
cross-referenced statute (Section 1117 of the ESEA), using the same methodology 
and procedures (in this case, a formula “that accounts for the number of children 
from low-income families”).194  Furthermore, the court noted that if Congress had 
meant to provide equal funding to private and public schools without distinction 
 
183 Id. at 2 (citing Providing Equitable Services to Students and Teachers in Non-Public 
Schools Under the CARES Act Programs, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/06/Providing-Equitable-
Services-under-the-CARES-Act-Programs-Update-6-25-2020.pdf (Apr. 30, 2020) at 3). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (referencing 85 Fed. Reg. 39,482) (emphasis in original). 
186 Id. (referencing 85 Fed. Reg. 39,482). 
187 Id. (referencing 85 Fed. Reg. 39,481). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 3. 
191 Id. (referencing Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
192 Id. (referencing Holland v. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 309 F.3d 808, 815 (D.C. Cir 2002)). 
193 Id. at 4. 
194 Id. 
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by income, it could have instead cited Section 8501 of the ESEA, which allows 
for that very formula.195  Congress’s choice of Section 1117 makes its intent in 
the manner of fund distribution clear.196 
The Department put forth several arguments in defense of its interpretation 
of the statute.  It first attempted to argue that the term “equitable services” was 
ambiguous and in light of that, its interpretation was reasonable.197  While the 
court noted that this notion may have been true in isolation, it also found that 
Congress’s cross referencing of Section 1117 of the ESEA should have directed 
the Department’s attention to the specific formula found there.198  The 
Department also argued that Section 18005(a) was facially ambiguous, but the 
court states that “simply because Congress could have been clearer, that alone 
does not render an unambiguous text ambiguous.”199  The Department also relied 
on the supposed disparity between the CARES Act (to deliver emergency relief to 
all schools) and Title I-A (to allow aid to low-achieving students).200  The court 
noted that purposive arguments such as this cannot overcome the text of the 
statute and that the text of the CARES Act itself “calls for ‘[a]ctivities to address 
the unique needs of low-income children or students.’”201 
The Department’s final argument, based on the statute’s structure, claimed 
that provisions of Section 1117 of the ESEA would render other sections of the 
CARES Act superfluous, such as sections about public schools consulting with 
private schools about equitable services and public schools retaining control over 
funds.202  The court counters with precedent that redundancy does not affect the 
plain meaning of the statute as written – “that it incorporates that formula 
described in Section 1117 for distributing equitable services by the number of 
children from low-income families.”203 
The plaintiffs’ final argument “contend[ed] that the Department exceeded 
its delegated authority by promulgating the interim final rule.”204  Upon 
examining this argument, the court found that neither general rulemaking 
authority provision set out in precedent accounted for the Department’s action 
here.205  The text of the CARES Act directs the Secretary to allocate funds from 
the sub-funds in the same manner cross-referenced in the ESEA statute, as 






199 Id. at 5. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. (citing CARES Act § 18003(d)(4)). 
202 Id. 
203 Id.  See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 236 (2011); Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2019). 
204 DeVos at 5. 
205 Id. at 6.  See Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 466 F.3d 134, 
139 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Agencies are … bound, not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has 
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discretion in the allocation of funds.206  Because of this disparity, Congress’s 
decision to withhold authority from the Secretary regarding this section was 
intentional.207 The court ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause the Act is not 
ambiguous and did not otherwise delegate rulemaking authority, the Department 
acted beyond its authority in promulgating the interim final rule.”208 
 
Holding 
 The court granted the plaintiffs’ expedited motion for summary 
judgment.209  Under the APA, courts are to “‘hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action’ that is in excess of statutory authority or ‘not in accordance with law.’”210  
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the interim final rule created by the 
Department was “contrary to the unambiguous mandate of the Act” and that the 
Act did not provide the Department with rulemaking authority nor ambiguity for 
the agency to address.211  Congress’s intent in the CARES Act was not ambiguous 
as it specifically cross-referenced a section of the ESEA that allowed for a 
specific formula of distributing funds.212  Additionally, the Department acted 
outside of its granted authority in the CARES Act by issuing the final interim rule 
in regard to this section.213  The court therefore set aside the interim rule.214 
 
Impact   
 The court expresses deference to the clear language of Congress in this 
case, noting that a department has overstepped its bounds in attempting to 
interpret an unambiguous statute in a contrary way.  It notes substantial precedent 
for the notion that a regulation crafted by a department that is contrary to an 
existing statute should be regarded as null and void.215  Furthermore, the court 
notes that “[a] lthough some might agree with the Department's position as a 
matter of policy, “‘[a]n agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic 
policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.’”216  This is undoubtedly 
a warning to government agencies to be mindful of their boundaries when 
interpreting policy.  
  
 
206 DeVos at 6. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1. 
210 Id. at 3 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)). 
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213 Id. at 6. 
214 Id. at 3. 
215 See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); 
Orion Reserves Ltd. P’ship v. Salazar, 553 F.3d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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United States v. Cardena, 461 F.Supp.3d 798 (N.D. Ill. 2020) 
 
Synopsis 
The defendant, a convict serving time in prison for drug-trafficking-related 
offenses, filed a motion for compassionate release due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.  The government alleged that the defendant had not properly exhausted 
proper administrative remedies.  After considering the case, the district court held 
that the government failed to bear its burden of proof and that even if it had, the 
exhaustion requirement should be waived.  The court found that the extraordinary 
circumstances surrounding the coronavirus pandemic merited compassionate 
release and that compassionate release was consistent with relevant statutory 
sentencing factors. 
 
Facts and Analysis 
 Robert Cardena, a 41-year-old man, moved for compassionate release 
under 18. U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a statute which permits sentence 
modification under “extraordinary and compelling circumstances.”217  His 
original charge related to a racketeering conspiracy and possession of cocaine 
with the intent to sell, but the court at his sentencing found that Cardena was a 
minor participant in the offenses and that his involvement was limited.218  To 
date, he served more than nine years of his ten year sentence and had one minor 
disciplinary issue while in prison.219 
Cardena, had been diagnosed with hypertension and Type II diabetes.220  
Both of these conditions are considered risk factors for COVID-19.221  Cardena 
moved for compassionate release based on the fact that the pandemic itself, in 
addition to his “current placement in a residential reentry center (RRC) where he 
is in close contact with other inmates circulating in the wider community and very 
close to the end of his sentence” amounted to “extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances that the court did not and could not have foreseen at sentencing.”222  
Following an emergency letter motion written by Cardena without the assistance 
of a lawyer asking for compassionate release or home confinement under the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), the court 
appointed a lawyer and set a deadline for the government’s response.223   
In its response, the government asserted that the motion for compassionate 
release was moot because the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had transferred 
Cardena from the federal prison in Milan, Michigan to a halfway house in 
Wisconsin and that Cardena did not properly exhaust administrative remedies 
before filing for compassionate release.224  The court previously rejected the 
 
217 United States v. Cardena, 461 F.Supp.3d 798, 799 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (citing 18. U.S.C. § 
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government’s mootness argument and Cardena no longer sought home 
confinement, only that he be granted compassionate release.225 
The court first considers the government’s claim that Cardena did not 
exhaust administrative remedies as required by the First Step Act of 2018.226  The 
Act states that “the defendant may also bring a motion for compassionate release 
‘after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure 
of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse 
of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's 
facility.’”227  The government asserted that Cardena did not submit a request for 
compassionate release at the time the case was brought, although he had since 
filed an administrative request for compassionate release.228  However, the 
government conceded that the Seventh Circuit would likely follow the rule in 
United States v. Taylor, which held that “§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s statutory exhaustion 
requirement is not jurisdictional but is rather a claims-processing rule.”229  
Ultimately, the court found that the statutory exhaustion requirement in Section 
3582(c)(1)(A) (as well as the relevant 30-day waiting period) could be waived in 
certain circumstances.230 
However, the court noted that it still must examine whether the 
government met its burden of proof in regard to exhaustion.231  The government 
did not inform the court about the result of Cardena’s impending request for 
compassionate release and the court notes that it is unlikely that the BOP has 
come to a final decision regarding it.232  The court “cannot assume that facts exist 
which the government has the burden to prove.”233  However, even if the 
government had met its burden, the court found that the exhaustion requirement 
would be waived in this case.234  “Courts have found that the text of § 
3582(c)(1)(A) and the legislative history of the First Step Act demonstrate that in 
limited circumstances the 30-day waiting period can be waived if it “‘could not 
serve the congressional objective of ensuring prisoners receive a meaningful and 
prompt opportunity for a judicial determination on the motion.’”235  When 
considering the coronavirus pandemic and its risks, the court held that the 
“purpose of the statute is served by waiving the 30-day waiting period.”236   
The court then moved to the merits of Cardena’s motion for 
compassionate release.237  It noted the catch-all provision in the current legislation 
and stated that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the list of extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances to be examined on a motion for compassionate release) serves as 
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guidance rather than binding rules.238  The court decided that the defendant’s 
medical condition, age, and family circumstances are no longer the only factors to 
consider, and when considering the present case, Cardena’s diagnosed medical 
conditions, the threat of exposure to COVID-19, and the fact that his sentence was 
drawing to a close constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances.239  In 
the prison where Cardena was housed when he filed his motion, there were over 
forty confirmed cases of COVID-19 and the government’s contention that the 
halfway house where Cardena currently resides has no confirmed cases bore little 
weight, as the BOP tested only those who exhibited symptoms.240  The court 
noted that many infected individuals do not show symptoms and the “crowded 
conditions in halfway houses make an outbreak from even a small number of 
cases more likely than in the general population because staff and residents often 
circulate through the facility.”241  With the facts before it, the court concluded that 
extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a compassionate release 
were present here.242 
However, the court then conducted its analysis of the factors it considered 
when it originally sentenced Cardena.243  When considering the need to protect 
the public, the court noted that Cardena “has little in the way of a criminal 
record”244 and that “the BOP's early transfer of Cardena to a RRC further suggests 
strongly that it concurs that Cardena has reached the point at which facilitating his 
transition to the community is warranted.”245  Cardena took courses in prison to 
assist in his transition and had a solid reentry plan that the court found sufficiently 




The court ultimately granted Cardena’s motion for compassionate 
release.247  Cardena’s requirement to exhaust all administrative remedies before 
making his request would have been waived by the court had the government met 
its burden of proof on the issue.248  Furthermore, the extenuating circumstances of 
the COVID-19 pandemic constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances 
allowing for a compassionate release.249  Finally, when looking at Cardena’s 
situation specifically, the court concluded that due to his lack of a substantial 
criminal record and his stable reentry plan, compassionate release should be 
granted.250 
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 This case has a short-term impact on those prisoners seeking release due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  With prisons being a high-risk area, those with pre-
existing conditions now have a district court precedent upon which to rest a 
motion for compassionate release.  It also has a long-term impact in terms of 
compassionate release requests in the future.  Courts are increasingly less bound 
to the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 factors as anything more than guidelines, so prisoners 
with other extenuating factors have a chance for compassionate release.  
Furthermore, the court here noted that in limited circumstances, the 30-day 
waiting period and the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies can be 
waived.  This case will prove instructive for inmates filing for compassionate 
release both during the coronavirus pandemic and in the future. 
